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Abstract 
By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be 
accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs 
inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up 
capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than 
today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term 
price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a 
more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-
term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with 
a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or 
energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and 
renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding 
system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative 
barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by 
merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual 
agreements. 
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The EU power sector needs  
long-term price signals 
Fabio Genoese, Eleanor Drabik and Christian Egenhofer* 
CEPS Special Report No. 135 / April 2016 
Executive Summary 
The European Commission has announced a legislative proposal to implement the Third 
Energy Package in full and to make the electricity market fit for a low-carbon future. One of 
the biggest challenges will be to ensure that the market gives adequate price signals for 
commercial investment in generation capacity and for maintaining sufficient capacity online 
to guarantee security of supply. Additional capacity will be required both for renewables and 
to replace carbon-intensive generation with more flexible, less carbon-intensive forms. In 2030, 
half of the EU’s electricity demand will be met by renewables, and in 2050 the power sector 
will have to be completely carbon-free. 
The transition to low-carbon electricity implies an increasing share of generation capacity with 
high upfront costs. This is different from the technology choices envisaged by the Third 
Package. In low-carbon technology investments, costs mainly occur in the planning and 
construction phase; there is limited scope to reduce costs once a wind turbine or solar panel 
has been deployed. High upfront costs imply that the cost of capital has a proportionally 
greater impact on total costs when compared to today’s technologies. Consequently, both 
uncertainty and risk will play a greater role in investment decisions than is the case today. 
This has been widely recognised for renewables, for example by the International Energy 
Agency; 1  but it applies to flexible back-up resources in a similar way, because of their 
progressively lower running time (load factor).  
Insufficient long-term price signals will be reflected in the cost of capital for an investment, 
ultimately resulting in higher costs for consumers. This can lead to inappropriate investment 
or divestment signals, i.e. too-late investment or short-sighted capacity retirement choices, for 
example in gas, which might turn out to be inefficient in the long run. In the case of renewables, 
where policy targets exist, great uncertainty about future cash flows means paying more to 
achieve the same result.  
This report examines whether markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals and 
thereby reduce the cost of capital for renewables and flexible conventional resources alike. In 
the current market framework, long-term arrangements can in principle originate from 
bilateral contracts or forward markets, i.e. a central marketplace for trading electricity ahead 
of delivery.  
                                                   
* Fabio Genoese is Research Fellow and Eleanor Drabik is Research Assistant at CEPS. Christian Egenhofer 
is Senior Fellow and Head of the Energy and Climate programme at CEPS and Director of the Energy 
Climate House. 
1 See IEA (2016). 
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Most bilateral contracts tend to be short- to medium-term with a forward period of five years 
or less. A similar observation can be made for forward markets: The volume of commercial 
transactions (‘liquidity’) tends to decrease with increasing forward periods. Data from the 
German forward market – which is the most liquid market in the EU – confirms that liquidity 
decreases to zero for contracts with a forward period of more than three years. Thus, no long-
term price signals are currently emerging from forward markets. In addition, the currently 
most common contract type requires a continuous supply over an entire year. This is neither 
compatible with the intermittent character of renewables nor with the flexible resources that 
are used to counterbalance the intermittency of renewables.  
A reason for this decrease in liquidity is that the individual benefit from long-term contracting 
is and will remain limited. The demand-side does not see an economic need to secure supply 
a long time ahead of delivery. Consumers trust that the regulator will de facto hedge them 
against the risk of physical shortage (‘regulatory paternalism’). Moreover, security of supply 
is and will likely remain a public good, because it is difficult to selectively disconnect 
consumers in a meshed electricity network in times of physical shortage (non-excludability). 
For bilateral contracts, there is also a counterparty default risk, which results in a cost of 
guarantee, i.e. the amount compensated if one counterparty terminates the contract early. It 
grows exponentially with the delivery date, which is why most bilateral contracts tend to be 
short- to medium-term arrangements. 
Long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could address this issue. If properly 
designed they can reduce uncertainty, and therefore the cost of capital. Generally, these 
contracts could focus on capacity or energy, or a combination of both. In a centralised design, 
this could lead to the creation of capacity auctions– for conventional or renewable capacity or 
both. Long-term contracts for energy would resemble modern renewable support schemes, 
albeit amended by more competitive elements. A competitive bidding process for price 
discovery and regional adequacy assessments should be the rule to ensure cost-effectiveness. 
Clarification in existing legislation could reduce the barriers to establishing competitive long-
term contracts. To this end, forthcoming legislative proposals on a new electricity market 
design and the forthcoming policy framework for renewables could make explicit reference to 
the advantage of competitively determined long-term contracts to promote decarbonisation 
and ensure security of supply. 
Moreover, authorisation processes for implementing new mechanisms are often arduous and 
approval periods can take several years. Approval could be streamlined and shortened, if the 
necessary prerequisites for introducing such mechanisms were merged into one piece of 
legislation. Secondly, it would be advantageous to have a set of EU framework rules in place 
for the design of these contractual agreements, including guidance on length, types of 
instruments and participation of cross-border resources. If executed, both these points may 
lead to a more efficient implementation process of mechanisms ensuring decarbonisation, 
security of supply, increased investor certainty and support for the completion of the internal 
market. 
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1. About the importance of long-term price signals 
The power sector is a rather capital-intensive business with long investment cycles, because 
plants operate for 20 years or more. For this reason, a stable framework is needed in which 
investors are confident that costs can be recovered in reasonable payback times. Price signals 
and long-term confidence in these signals are an essential ingredient for cost-effective 
investment decisions in generation capacity. In the absence of long-term price signals, it is 
more likely that inappropriate investment or divestment decisions are taken, i.e. too-late 
decisions or technology choices that turn out to be inefficient in the long run.  
In this context, the underlying question is how to allocate risks between private investors and 
the public. Risks have costs irrespective of whether the public takes it via regulation or whether 
investors do. However, by allocating risk to the party best able to manage it, these costs can be 
reduced.  
If confidence in long-term price signals is assured, the financing costs of an investment will be 
lower, ceteris paribus. In a competitive market, this will translate into lower costs for consumers. 
This fact is well-recognised for renewables, but is applicable to back-up capacity as well. In a 
low-carbon economy, the cost of capital has a proportionally greater impact on total costs than 
it had in the past. This is because resources such as wind and solar power have high upfront 
but close-to-zero operating costs. Back-up capacity has a similar cost structure because upfront 
costs have to be recovered from a progressively lower number of hours of operation. 
In this report, we argue that the current market design is not necessarily the most suitable to 
handle a high share of both low-carbon and back-up capacity and to ensure an adequate level 
of back-up capacity, especially not in times of declining or stagnant demand for conventional 
resources.  
This is of particular importance because the European power sector is heading precisely this 
direction: the EU’s clean energy commitments mean that in 2030 half of generation will come 
from renewables, mostly supplied by wind and solar. Moreover, 50% of conventional capacity 
could be on stand-by for 80% of the time in 2030, thus mainly serving as back-up. Finally, the 
next decade will be marked by a continuous decline in net demand, i.e. a decline in total 
demand net of renewables. This will put pressure on wholesale market revenues, lowering 
confidence in the conditions for recouping operating and investment costs.  
1.1 The EU power sector: Future trends 
Implementing the EU 2030 climate and energy framework2 will define the main direction for 
the future development of the EU power sector. While the policy framework does not state 
what the overall objective of ‘at least 27% renewables by 2030’ means for the power sector, one 
                                                   
2 In October 2014 the European Council decided on a new set of policy targets for 2030. The framework 
includes binding targets for (i) domestically reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below 1990 
levels and for (ii) increasing the share of renewables to at least 27% as well as an indicative target to 
improve energy efficiency by at least 27% compared to “business-as-usual” scenario. 
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can expect that the share of renewable electricity will rise from 27% in 2014 to 49-51% in 2030, 
based on current3 projections.4  
Figure 1. Total electricity demand and demand net of renewables (EU-28, 2005-30) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (2016) and Resch et al. (2015). 
Intermittent resources such as wind and solar will be driving this increase: in 2030, 60-75% of 
renewable power will be supplied by these technologies. Consequently, the share of wind and 
solar in total power generation is expected to be around 38%. By the end of 2014, these two 
technologies had a 14% share in gross electricity production.  
Even assuming further technology cost reductions of renewables, their ability to recover full 
costs under the current market framework, which is based on short-term price signals, will be 
subject to high uncertainty. Already today, intermittent renewables tend to earn less than the 
average market price, i.e. the higher their production, the lower the market price they receive. 
Ultimately, this is because their production is determined by the availability of wind and sun 
– their highest production output is unlikely to coincide with peak electricity demand. 
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that their market value decreases with increasing 
market share (see Figure 2). This is typically referred to as cannibalisation effect. 
                                                   
3 See SWD(2014) 15 final. 
4 See Resch et al. (2015). 
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Figure 2. Market value of onshore wind and solar PV in Germany (2004-15) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Hirth (2013), EPEX (2016) & ENTSO-E (2016). 
The shift towards more renewables has two major implications for conventional resources. 
First, electricity demand net of renewables will decrease by around 400 TWh compared to 2014 
according to current estimations (see Figure 1). This decline is equivalent to the size of the 
Italian and Dutch power system combined. Second, the maximum required firm capacity to 
serve demand will also decrease, but not nearly as strongly. This is due to the weather-
dependent availability of wind and solar: cloudy, windless day might coincide with peak 
electricity demand. For these events, sufficient firm capacity must be available.5  
The combination of the two effects entails that firm capacity will be utilised less often, i.e. 
running hours decrease. By 2030, roughly 50% of conventional capacity could be on stand-by 
for 80% of the year, thus mainly serving as back-up. Their risk profile will be similar to today’s 
peaking plants: fixed and investment costs would have to be recovered from revenues created 
during a very low number of running hours, i.e. a higher-than-ever dependency on rare 
scarcity events, implying a high uncertainty of future cash flows.  
Another challenge is that the exact level of back-up capacity required is subject to greater 
uncertainty than today, because this level depends on the pace of deploying renewables and 
its mix as well as technological developments. It is not trivial to forecast the pace of 
deployment, because this development is policy-driven. Policy targets for renewables are set 
as a share of total demand. To maintain a projected pathway for the share of renewables, an 
                                                   
5 In practice, a resource adequacy assessment will be carried out to estimate how demand-side resources 
can reduce the need for firm capacity. 
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unexpected change in total demand (denominator) would have to be matched by a change in 
the pace of deployment (numerator). In practice, such fine-tuning is both difficult to 
implement and may ultimately result in a stop-and-go deployment process, which is 
politically undesirable. 
Under the current market framework, investment decisions for a large part of the fleet – 
renewables and back-up capacity – will therefore be subject to significant uncertainty and this 
will be reflected in financing costs. Consequently, some investment decisions for back-up 
capacity might be postponed while waiting for a clearer outlook of actual consumer needs and 
energy policies, leading to exacerbated boom-bust cycles. For existing back-up capacity, this 
uncertainty results in an increased risk of mothballing or early closure for economic reasons, 
i.e. when fixed operation and maintenance costs can no longer be covered. Instead, 
investments in renewables may be taken despite high financing costs – because capacity must 
be added to meet policy targets. This, however, results in higher-than-necessary costs for 
consumers, meaning that the same result could be achieved at lower costs with an adapted 
market framework. 
1.2 A decline in demand is similar to an increase of low-marginal-cost generation 
A long period of declining demand generally poses challenges for recouping investments 
under the current market framework. A drop in demand puts pressure on wholesale market 
revenues, because prices are set by the bid of the marginal unit. An increase in generation from 
low-marginal-cost resources such as wind and solar is comparable to a decline in demand: 
wholesale prices decrease, because high-marginal-cost units are displaced. This is typically 
referred to as merit-order effect.6 
As a result, new plants will be unable to recover their fixed and investment costs. This affects 
all plant types, including low-carbon resources, not just peak load generators. The magnitude 
of this effect largely depends on the extent and duration of the decline in demand. In the 2030 
context, the development of both total and net demand will be significantly driven by policy, 
e.g. by electrification initiatives as well as targets for efficiency and renewables, but also by 
taxes and tariffs on electricity vis-à-vis competing energy carriers such as oil and gas, which 
dominate the transport and heating sectors. Consequently, long-term price signals for 
generation assets are more difficult to be provided by the market. 
The current period of declining electricity demand and increase in low-carbon generation 
provides some useful insights into the potential magnitude of the problem of recouping 
investments. In 2014, total electricity demand in the EU-28 was 7-10% below projections and 
6% below the pre-crisis level (see Figure 3). This shows the kind and magnitude of the 
uncertainty facing investors, rendering the experience gained from past scarcity practically 
irrelevant when it comes to forecasting future scarcity events. 
                                                   
6 See Sensfuss et al. (2008) and Sáenz de Miera et al. (2008). 
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Figure 3. Expected vs. actual electricity demand in the EU-28 (2005-20) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat (2016) and NREAPs (2010). 
This has affected both the market prices and economic performance of power plants. A case 
study for the German market reveals that full cost recovery will not be possible for any recently 
built plant, if the current trend continues. This would also apply to low-carbon generation 
from wind power, if it were not subsidised. In 2014, spot market profits of a modern gas-fired 
unit were not even sufficient to cover annual maintenance costs, let alone recoup the 
investment. The 2014 cash flow of a modern coal-fired plant was more than 60% below the 
required level for full cost recovery. Needless to say, this has damaged the general investment 
climate. 
2. Long-term price signals in today’s market design 
There is general consensus that there are several benefits to contracting electricity in advance 
of delivery. First, they create more predictable cash flows, which lessens investment risk and 
diminishes the boom and bust cycles associated with the construction of new power stations 
and with maintaining a sufficient level of existing plants online. Second, consumers benefit 
from less volatile retail prices because electricity is purchased ahead of delivery rather than on 
a fluctuating spot market. Third, long-term price signals promote competition by facilitating 
the entry of new market players. This was one of the reasons why the European Commission 
approved the British capacity remuneration mechanism. Fourth, long-term arrangements are 
a cost-effective way of promoting low-carbon resources, provided that a competitive bidding 
process is used for price discovery. This is due to their capital-intensity: technologies such as 
wind and solar face high upfront but close-to-zero operating costs. Costs mainly occur in the 
planning and construction phase, but there is limited room to reduce costs once a wind turbine 
or solar panel has been deployed. 
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In the current market framework, long-term arrangements originate from bilateral contracts, 
which can also be tradable. 
2.1 Bilateral long-term contracts 
A bilateral contract is an agreement between a buyer and seller to exchange electricity on 
negotiated terms. These terms typically include, but are not limited to, the contract length, 
price per unit of electricity and times of performance. The price can be fixed or indexed, for 
instance to the spot market price of electricity, or the price of a fuel. These contracts give both 
parties price predictability for a period of time and allow buyers to reduce their exposure to 
future fluctuating spot prices. In order to respond to short-term changes in demand, bilateral 
contracts are typically complemented by option contracts or spot market purchases. This way, 
buyers can hedge their risk for the majority of their purchases through long-term contracts, 
but also respond to short-term changes in consumer demand.  
Bilateral long-term contracts generally face the challenge of a counterparty default risk, which 
results in a cost of guarantee, i.e. an amount that is compensated, if the contract is annulled. 
The guarantee generally increases with contract length. For this reason, most bilateral 
contracts tend to be short- to medium-term agreements with a forward period of five years or 
less.7  
Another reason for the limited forward period is the uncertainty regarding the approval 
process. Bilateral long-term contracts are likely to be subject to approval by the European 
Commission to ensure that these contracts do not foreclose the market. 
In recent years, a prominent example of a bilateral long-term contract was the Exeltium project 
in France, founded by industrial consumers to provide a stable and competitive electricity 
price for the electro-intensive industries over a long period. EDF offered to deliver electricity 
for a 24-year period under a take-or-pay contract. It was agreed that 311 TWh of electricity 
would be supplied over that period at a price indexed to the operating costs of EDF’s nuclear 
power plants. 
This bilateral agreement, suggested by EDF and Exeltium, was approved after five years of 
negotiation with the European Commission, in March 2010. While this example may not be 
representative for other EU member states due to the relatively high market concentration in 
France, it highlights a major challenge of bilateral long-term contracting: uncertain approval 
procedures.  
2.2 Tradable long-term contracts 
An alternative to bilateral contracting are forward electricity markets, which essentially are 
central marketplaces where a buyer can secure electricity generation ahead of delivery from a 
seller (generator). Unlike bilateral contracts, these contracts are tradable, meaning that the 
price is transparent, thus reducing information asymmetry between market participants. 
                                                   
7 The traded volume for contracts with a forward period above four years roughly amounts to zero, see ICIS (2016). 
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On today’s forward markets, the most popular contract types have a duration of one year and 
offer various forward periods. A forward period defines the year of delivery and can be any 
future year following the year the contract is traded. Market liquidity, however, tends to 
decrease with increasing forward periods.  
The most liquid market in the EU is the German forward market. Practically speaking, today’s 
forward markets offer tradable contracts, but no tradable long-term contracts. This is illustrated 
in Figure 4. In the trading year 2015, contracts agreed for the forward period 2016 was 65% of 
German gross electricity production in 2014. Contracts secured for the forward year 2019 are 
already negligible at 2% of German gross electricity production in 2014. Consequently, the 
long-term predictability of revenue streams for new generators remains limited under this 
system.  
Figure 4. Volume of forward contracts in the trading year 2015 in the German power market 
(product: Phelix-Base-Year-Future) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on EEX (2016). 
One reason for this decrease in liquidity is that risk premiums grow exponentially with the 
delivery date. There are no suitable long-term hedging instruments8 – neither for relevant 
production cost factors (price of coal, gas, carbon), nor for the risk of a regulatory intervention, 
or for the counterparty default risk. As a result, the current demand of end-consumers for 
long-term contracts is close to zero. 
It is worth pointing out that the current products are neither suited to trade renewable 
electricity in forward markets nor to trade flexible resources that are used to counterbalance 
the intermittency of renewables. This is because the agreements are based on a production 
schedule that is defined ex ante. Example schedules include a constant production over the 
whole year (so-called base-year-future) or a constant production during all peak hours of a 
year (so-called peak-load-year-future). Such a production schedule is not compatible with the 
                                                   
8 In this context, a forward period exceeding five years can be considered long-term. 
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intermittent nature of renewables and consequently neither to the output of flexible back-up 
resources. For this reason, new products have been proposed by power exchanges but it 
remains unclear who would be the buyer of such contracts. Moreover, assuming that buyers 
will be found, market liquidity would still decrease with increasing forward periods, for the 
same reasons as discussed earlier. Thus, no long-term price signals would emerge. 
3. Possible ways forward 
3.1 Facilitate bilateral long-term contracting 
Bilateral long-term contracting can be facilitated by offering hedging instruments for relevant 
cost factors, because risk premiums grow exponentially with delivery date. 
In this context, one important cost factor is the cost of guarantee. It results from the risk that 
one of the contracting parties terminates the contract early. The cancellation of contracts may, 
for instance, be triggered by an unexpectedly strong decline or increase of future market 
prices, possibly caused by a regulatory intervention, making the negotiated price 
uncompetitive for one counterparty. An option to facilitate bilateral contracting would be to 
socialise the cost of this guarantee, meaning that the implications of extreme changes in the 
overall price level would be shared among all consumers and thus not considered in the 
bilateral cost of guarantee. 
In practice, market players (generators, retailers, end-consumers) that decide to enter into 
long-term arrangements would not have to sign the full guarantee due to not having to cover 
the full spectrum of future prices but only those prices with a high probability of being 
realised. The difference between the full cost of guarantee and the guarantee paid by the 
signing parties would then have to be socialised. It would only come into effect, if these 
improbable price levels were realised.  
At this stage, this option is only a theoretical proposal. While the Italian regulator had started 
a public consultation on the matter in 2008, it was not followed up, i.e. no concrete piece of 
regulation or legislation was proposed.9  
Socialising the cost of guarantee would probably increase the liquidity of tradable bilateral 
contracts with a delivery date of 2-3 years in the future. Yet it is unlikely to impact the trade of 
contracts with later delivery dates because demand largely remains short-sighted, with no 
(economic) need to secure electricity supply a long period in advance of delivery. One of the 
major underlying reasons is regulatory paternalism: consumers trust that the regulator will de 
facto hedge them against the risk of physical shortage. Moreover, reliability clearly is and will 
likely remain a public good because it is difficult to selectively disconnect consumers in a 
meshed electricity network in times of physical shortage (so-called non-excludability). The 
individual benefit from long-term contracting is and will therefore remain limited. 
                                                   
9 See AEEGSI (2008). 
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3.2 Long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty 
A complementary measure could be to introduce long-term contracts with a regulated 
counterparty. Generally, one could design contracts for capacity or energy or a combination 
of both. In a centralised design, this could lead to the creation of capacity auctions – for 
conventional or renewable capacity or both. Long-term contracts for energy would resemble 
modern support schemes for renewables, albeit based on more competitive elements than in 
the past. In general, centralised systems should be based on a regional10 adequacy assessment 
and use a competitive bidding process for price discovery to ensure cost-effectiveness. 
If contracts were organised in a decentralised way, this would mean obliging retailers to enter 
into long-term agreements. In practice, this leads to certificate systems. Previous experiences 
with decentralised setups have been rather mixed, both at EU and international level. 
In the EU, there is evidence from renewable energy support systems that certificate systems 
offer less certainty regarding revenue streams than direct contracts with a regulated 
counterparty. This was one reason why the UK changed its renewable support from a 
certificate system (“Renewable Obligation Certificates, ROCs”) to direct contracts (“Contract-
for-Difference, CfD”) in 2013.  
From a retailer’s perspective, imposing long-term contracting obligations (for instance, firm 
capacity or renewable energy to be purchased under long-term contracts) may result in a 
disproportionate volume risk, and then in an incentive to limit the duration of the capacity 
and renewable energy contracts, rendering them less effective. Moreover, this could give an 
unfair competitive advantage to new retail entrants, as they would not be bound to high-cost, 
legacy contracts when they enter the market. For these reasons, a centralised approach is more 
likely to achieve the objective of providing long-term price signals.  
3.3 Legislation 
Currently, a variety of existing pieces of legislation govern rules for long-term contracts. This 
includes Directive 2005/89/EC (Security of Supply), Directive 2009/72/EC (Internal 
Electricity Market) and the Guidelines on State Aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020.  
Under the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC, a member state can set up new capacity, if the 
market fails to guarantee sufficient investment. Similarly, under the Directive 2005/89/EC, 
measures may be used to ensure security of supply. These measures include “contractual 
guarantees, capacity options or capacity obligations as well as non-discriminatory instruments 
such as capacity payments.”  
Finally, contract arrangements and regulations are considered state aid when a contract meets 
four conditions: first, it must provide an economic advantage. Second, it must favour a certain 
                                                   
10 A regional assessment takes into account to which extent neighbouring member states contribute to security of 
supply. 
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undertaking and be selective. Third, it must be state funded or be consumer funded but with 
some state involvement. Fourth, it must distort competition and affect cross-border trade. 
Under current legislation, long-term contracts are subject to case-by-case approval decisions 
with varying approval times. The UK proposed capacity auction was considered state aid due 
to meeting all four above-mentioned conditions. After much negotiation, it took one month 
for the Commission to approve the mechanism. In France, the Exeltium project took five years 
of negotiations to receive approval from the Commission. Long decision processes tend to be 
detrimental to investment.  
Clarification of existing legislation is needed to reduce barriers to establishing competitive 
long-term contracts. Upcoming legislative proposals on a new electricity market design and 
the forthcoming policy framework for renewables could make explicit reference to the 
advantage of competitively determined long-term contracts to promote decarbonisation and 
ensure security of supply. 
More generally, approval processes for long-term contracts could be streamlined and 
shortened if the necessary prerequisites for introducing such mechanisms were merged into 
one Directive rather than being spread across multiple directives and the Guidelines. 
Secondly, it would be advantageous to have a set of EU framework rules in place for the design 
of these contractual agreements, including guidance on length, types of instruments and 
participation of cross-border resources – in short: an updated EU Target Model. If executed, 
both these points may lead to a more efficient implementation process of mechanisms that 
ensure decarbonisation and security of supply, as well as increase investor certainty and 
support the completion of the internal market. 
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